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The Russia—Georgia war of August 2008 had repercussions well
beyond the South Caucasus. The war was the culmination of Western tensions
with Russia over its influence in the post—Soviet space, while the fallout exposed
divisions within the transatlantic community over how aggressively to confront
Moscow after its invasion of undisputed Georgian territory and its permanent
stationing of troops in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.1 The conflict also called
into question Georgia’s relationship with the United States, as well as U.S.
credibility as a regional security partner in light of Washington’s apparent
inability either to restrain Tbilisi from launching an attack against Tskhinvali in
August 2008 or to help its ally once the war began.2 Since the war, both the
United States and Europe have provided significant financial support to help
rebuild Georgia and have denounced the continued presence of Russian forces in
the breakaway territories. The transatlantic community, however, has failed to
develop a forward-looking strategy toward those territories.
The West’s adamant refusal to accept Russia’s recognition of the declared
independence of these two territories in August 2008 is legally correct, but just
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pledging enduring support for Georgia’s territorial integrity is impractical and
somewhat meaningless now that Abkhazia and South Ossetia are even further out
of Georgian sovereignty than they were before the war. These territories almost
certainly are lost to Georgia for the short and medium termspossibly for a period
of decadesand Russian influence has substantially increased in both regions.
Russia has formally recognized their independence, and perhaps ironically, the
territories have gone from enjoying de facto independence as unrecognized states
and parties to frozen conflicts, before August 2008, to becoming almost de facto
parts of the Russian Federation in their new status as ‘‘independent states.’’
Further, Russia has sought international support (particularly from Latin
American countries) for the policy, offering economic incentives to secure
recognition from third parties such as Nicaragua and Venezuela. Russia’s
‘‘sovereign diplomatic’’ offensive, therefore, has further eroded the very
international regime of sovereignty which Moscow professed to uphold when it
criticized Kosovo’s 2008 unilateral declaration of independence as a ‘‘dangerous
precedent.’’3
The war’s troubling consequences for the region’s territorial disputes do
not seem to have resulted in any updated Western policy initiatives or active
measures to rollback Russia’s accelerating absorption of Abkhazia and South
Ossetia. Nearly 20 years after the coll-
apse of the Soviet Union, Eurasia’s
unrecognized states remain isolated and
dependent on regional patrons, removed
from international governance structures,
rules, and norms. Instead of a region
pursuing greater global integration, the
unrecognized states continue to act as
islands of isolation while regional powers
seek to monopolize their interactions.
With these pressing factors in mind, we propose a basic outline of a new
approach called ‘‘engagement without recognition’’ for Western policy toward at
least Abkhazia, a policy that could serve as a model for crafting more robust
engagement with Eurasia’s other unrecognized states. According to this strategy,
Abkhazia would be given the opportunity to engage with the West on a number of
political, economic, social, and cultural issues for the purpose of lessening Russia’s
influence. While undertaking this strategy, the West must make it clear that
Abkhazia’s status as an independent state will never be accepted by either the
United States or the EU. By separating the international legal dimensions of
sovereignty (the question of non-recognition) from its governance aspects, the
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The Abkhaz and South Ossetian conflicts did not emerge full-blown in the
summer of 2008; they had been festering since the early 1990s when both
territories engaged in wars of secession. For most of the mid-1990s and 2000s, the
Western, particularly U.S., position on these issues supported and echoed
Tbilisi’s stance: Abkhazia and South Ossetia were integral parts of Georgia.
Policies were therefore oriented toward restoring Georgia’s territorial integrity
under some type of federalist formula, rather than focusing on resolving the
conflicts and devising some type of special sovereign status to grant the
breakaway territories.4
While Georgia has a clear, internationally recognized legal right to
sovereignty over the territories, post—Soviet Georgia has never really exercised
actual local control over Abkhazia, except for a few months in the early 1990s.
Thus, while Georgia may see itself as the rightful ruler of Abkhazia, the view in
Sukhumi has always been quite different. Similarly, even before the conflict of
2008, the notion of Georgia’s control over South Ossetia was largely aspirational
for the Georgian government and public. Yet, despite the facts that both
territories were described as frozen conflict areas for many of the past fifteen
years and both were recognized simultaneously and unilaterally as independent
states by Russia in August 2008, Abkhazia and South Ossetia do not raise
identical political challenges.
Abkhazia (roughly 220,000 people) has a much larger population than South
Ossetia (40,000—60,000) and displays at least some viability as an independent,
or even autonomous, polity. Independent statehood for South Ossetia, with its
tiny population, isolated geographic location, and lack of any economic base is
prima facie absurd. The specific challenges facing South Ossetiaincluding the
heavy, concentrated presence of Russian military forces and the very real security
dilemma caused by its proximity to Tbilisimake crafting a policy toward the
region a particularly confounding task.5 South Ossetians have evinced some
interest in exploring arrangements with North Ossetia, which is located just
across the border in the Russian Federation, or even a union with Russia along
the lines of the Russia—Belarus Union State. For all practical purposes, Russia
controls South Ossetia’s leadership and all strategically sensitive appointments in
its cabinet and security services.
The idea of an independent Abkhazia, however, is plausible, and reflects the
desire of most current residents of the territory.6 Abkhazia has a port on the Black
Sea and some natural resources. Moreover, its more developed political institutions
including semi-competitive elections, multiple political parties, civil society groups,
and some nominally independent media outletssuggest that Abkhazia has the
capacity for self-governance, or at least political autonomy.7




























At the same time, the issue of Georgian
internally displaced persons (IDPs) still
substantially weakens the Abkhaz
argument for independence. Approximately
250,000 ethnic Georgians, well over half
of the ethnic Georgians living in Abhkazia
at the time, were expelled from Abkhazia
in 1992—1993 during the first war with
Georgia.8 These people remain displaced
nearly 20 years after the conflict, despite receiving promises in recent years from
Tbilisi that they would be able to return to their homes imminently. Today, the
territory remains a multi-ethnic area with sizeable Abkhaz, Armenian, and
Ukrainian communities, as well as small numbers of Jews, Greeks, and
representatives of ethnic groups from the North Caucasus, but far fewer
Georgians than during the Soviet period or before.
The expulsion of ethnic Georgians from Abkhazia means that to recognize
Abkhaz independence without resolving the IDPs issue would, in some respects,
be rewarding ethnic cleansing. Abkhaz officials still do not have a coherent
strategy or policy to facilitate repatriation or otherwise resolve the problem of
IDPs, mainly because accepting the return of hundreds of thousands of people
would compromise the demographic make-upand by extension, the political
viabilityof the nascent Abkhaz state.9 Any future referendum on the legal
status of Abkhazia that does not involve the participation of at least a significant
percentage of expelled residents cannot be accepted as valid or legitimate. For
this reason, the West should not waver from its refusal to recognize Abkhaz
independence.
After the War
Since the conclusion of the war, the West has been firm in its refusal to recognize
the independence of Abkhazia. In total, four countriesNauru, Nicaragua,
Russia, and Venezuelahave recognized the independence of Abkhazia and
South Ossetia. For Nauru, Nicaragua, and Venezuela, recognitions seem to have
resulted from Russian lobbying and bilateral deals promising Russian aid or broader
investment in their respective energy sectors. Moscow appears determined to
secure recognition for Abkhazia and South Ossetia from additional Latin
American states, especially Bolivia and Ecuador, while Belarus, under
competing pressure from Brussels and Moscow, seems to be deferring its decision
for as long as possible.10 Although refusing to recognize Abkhaz independence
and challenging Russia’s new ‘‘recognition diplomacy’’ represents a good starting
point for Western policy toward Abkhazia, it is far from a strategic vision.
Isolation has
threatened to turn the
South Caucasus into a
proxy conflict.
THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY j OCTOBER 201062



























U.S. and EU policy toward Abkhazia, while not fully developed, also includes
a commitment to Georgia’s territorial integrity, which is usually described as
supporting, respecting, or even protecting this principle. In a September 2009
meeting with President Mikheil Saakashvili of Georgia, U.S. Secretary of State
Hillary Rodham Clinton said that the ‘‘United States supports [you] both in terms
of your [Georgia’s] territorial integrity and sovereignty.’’11 Similarly, following the
December 2009 Abkhaz presidential elections, an official EU statement declared
‘‘the European Union continues to support Georgia’s territorial integrity and
sovereignty, as recognised by international law.’’12
But western policymakers rarely consider that the phrase ‘‘territorial integrity’’
has a very specific meaning: that all of the territory which was part of Georgia at
the end of the Soviet period should be governed and secured by Tbilisi.
Constantly speaking of ‘‘territorial integrity’’ risks suggesting to both Tbilisi and
Sukhumi that the United States and the EU are open to proactive, or even
military, efforts to bring Abkhazia and South Ossetia back under Georgian
control. This rhetoric clearly contributed to the belief among some quarters in
Tbilisi in 2008 that, in spite of official warnings, the United States would
support Georgia in the August war.13
While unlikely to occur now, another war between Russia and Georgia would
come at a far greater cost for all parties, including the United States, which is still
viewed as Georgia’s ally and patron, compared to the previous conflict. But there
are other drawbacks short of war associated with consistently issuing public
commitments in support of Georgia’s ‘‘territorial integrity.’’ The Abkhaz
leadership and public interpret such proclamations as the United States and the
EU not having any interest in promoting cooperation or mutual understanding,
which in turn only drives Abkhazia even further into the arms of Russia. This is
exactly the outcome that needs to be avoided if Georgia is to ever restore its
territorial sovereignty.
Ironically, if the international community is serious about restoring Georgia’s
territorial integrity, one of the first things that it should do is to stop talking about
it so much. At a minimum, changing what is said about Georgia’s territorial
integrity is an easy way to further reduce the chance of another conflict.14
Specifically, supporting Georgian ‘‘sovereignty’’ rather than ‘‘territorial integrity’’
would justify and uphold Georgia’s valid international legal claims, while also
acknowledging the cold truth that the country’s territorial integrity remains
fractured.15
Abkhazia’s Growing Russian Dilemma
Western policy toward Abkhazia should also consider the profound changes in
the Russian-Abkhaz relationship since the war. The Abkhaz leadership greeted




























Medvedev’s August 2008 recognition of the independence of Abkhazia as a defining
moment of statehood. Though we in the West generally assume that Russia was
committed to supporting Abkhazia in its proxy conflict against the Saakashvili
regime prior to the August 2008 war, Sukhumi itself remained uncertain about the
degree of Moscow’s commitment to defend and support Abkhazia under the old
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) peacekeeping regime. Since Moscow’s
recognition of Abkhazia’s independence, Russia’s commitment has been affirmed
and demonstrated along a broad range of issues. Over the last two years, Moscow
and Sukhumi have been negotiating over 30 so-called bilateral agreements.16
Yet, Abkhazia’s overwhelming dependence on Russia as its principal security
and economic partner has raised concerns about excessive dependence among
Abkhaz politicians, media commentators, and civil society.17 In the security
realm, first and foremost, Abkhazia has become completely dependent on Russia
and has codified this domination through a number of lopsided security accords.
These accords have provided Sukhumi with a renewed sense of security, but have
also raised questions about Russia’s intentions in the territory. In May 2009,
Moscow and Sukhumi signed a border protection agreement through which the
Abkhaz side agreed to have 800 Russian troops
exclusively guard its border. The substance of
the agreement was expected by Sukhumi,
though its sudden adoption created some
political rumblings outside the Abkhaz
administration. The treaty was signed
without warning by the Abkhaz authorities
and the Russian Ministry of Defense, and was
not submitted to the Abkhaz parliament for
ratification or deliberation, leading to vocal
criticisms by Abkhaz parliamentarians and
journalists.18 Indeed, during an interview in April 2010, one opposition
member of the Abkhaz parliament recounted how he was accused of being
‘‘anti-Russian’’ when he pointed out that, in the implementation of the joint
defense agreement, Russian troops seemed to have completely taken over
functions meant to be jointly carried out with Abkhaz counterparts.19
Russia’s military role in Abkhazia was further enshrined in September 2009 by
the signing of a treaty of military cooperation, which granted Russia access to
military facilities and bases in Abkhazia (including the airbase at Gudauta and
naval facilities at Ochamchire) for a period of 49 years.20 Under the treaty,
Russian troops will retain the right of unrestricted mobility throughout Abkhazia
and will remain immune from Abkhazian criminal law as well as exempt from
taxation. Though reports indicate that Moscow is now only maintaining about
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presence is estimated to cost $500 million, and is much more visible throughout
Abkhazia than were the previous CIS peacekeepers.
Beyond the security realm, the Abkhaz leadership has also agreed to transfer
various strategic economic and transportation assets to Russia and to adopt
several Russian technical and commercial standards. The Russian ruble remains
Abkhazia’s official currency; in October 2009 the territory accepted Russian
telephone prefixes (with the code 7) to replace its Georgian ones (995).21
In fact, Russian-Abkhaz tensions were stoked in October 2008 when the Russian
company Inter RAO UES announced its intentions to privatize its stake in the
jointly-operated (with Georgia) Inguri Valley hydroelectric generator. De facto
president of Abkhazia, Sergei Bagapsh, angrily reacted to not being consulted by
the company, and proclaimed that the Inguri project ‘‘has always been and will
remain ours, and we will dictate terms in any negotiations.’’22 The Russian
company backed down from its original plans and subsequently reached a
compromise deal with the Ministry of Energy of Georgia to operate the plant for
the next ten years.
Soon after casting himself as a defender of Abkhazia’s strategic assets,
however, Bagapsh came under intense criticism for another series of commercial
transfers to Russia. In May 2009, he announced a plan to transfer the
management of Abkhazia’s railways and Sukhumi airport to Russia for ten
years in exchange for investment and loans.23 In October 2009, the two sides
readied a formal transportation agreement that would also transfer responsibility
for Abkhazia’s air-traffic control and navigation to Russia.24 Furthermore, in a
high-profile announcement in May 2009, the Abkhazia de facto Ministry of
Economy signed an agreement with the Russian state-owned oil company
Rosneft that ceded the rights to explore the Abkhaz continental shelf for five
years, as well as to sell Rosneft’s products in Abkhazia. Most controversially of
all, Bagapsh has hinted over the course of the year that Sukhumi is considering
allowing Russian citizens and economic entities the limited right to purchase
land in Abkhazia, which if enacted, would lead to an almost instantaneous
transfer of Abkhazia’s coveted coastline to wealthy Russian buyers. Other
Abkhaz officials, in private, express concerns that if such a measure were to be
adopted, all Abkhaz real estate would be owned by Moscow in a matter of
weeks.25
The Abkhaz dilemma regarding Russian control of its security and economy
grows more acute by the day. Economically, Russia is responsible for up to 95
percent of Abkhazia’s trade, and directly subsidizes more than 50 percent of
Sukhumi’s central budget, so it will inevitably play a dominant role in the
territory.26 A senior Abkhaz official said in an interview that Russia will provide
a total of $120 million in budget support to Sukhumi in 2010, and has
committed a similar amount for 2011 and 2012.27 An increasing number of




























Abkhaz opposition figures and media commentators are uncomfortable with
their leadership’s transfer of key strategic assets to Russia. Abkhaz presidential
candidate in 2009 and prominent businessman, Beslan Butba of the Economic
Development Party, strongly criticized the Abkhaz authorities, warning that
Abkhazia’s transfer of natural resources will erode the territory’s future capacity
for political independence.28 Similarly, another opposition presidential
candidate Raul Khadzhimba, a former vice president who resigned in May
2009, accused the Abkhaz leadership of selling Abkhazia’s sovereignty for its own
economic gain. Speaking at an opposition forum on July 24, 2009, Khadzimba
warned that ‘‘the authorities have taken the new realities, not as a basis for
strengthening our statehood, but as a signal for realizing their own material
interests. Such an approach strips our people, which bought its independence at
great cost, of any chance of free development.’’29
The vast majority of Abkhaz are grateful to Russia for providing it with security
forces to deter Georgian aggression. Abkhazia no longer fears for its security and is
no longer concerned about the intentions of the Saakashvili government. But the
one-sided terms of the Russian presence serve as a daily reminder that Sukhumi
has delegated some very basic state functions to Moscow, even if they are couched
as ‘‘interstate agreements.’’ This is, however, a trade-off that the current Abkhaz
leadership seems perfectly willing to accept in return for its security.
Engagement without Recognition
With these considerations in mind, now is the time for the United States to
increase its political engagement with Abkhazia. The West should continue to
make clear that it will never recognize the independence of Sukhumi, though it
can and should carve out a number of openings through which Abkhazia’s
political elites, business community, and civil society can build ties to people in
Europe, the broader Black Sea region, and North America. The alternative is to
continue to force Abkhazia to choose between either partnering with Russia or
returning to Georgia, an easy choice for Abkhazia that only further accelerates
Sukhumi’s absorption by Moscow. The availability of pursuing a new
international path will strengthen the hand of Abkhaz political leaders, media
commentators, and civil society leaders interested in crafting a ‘‘multivector’’
foreign policy, and offer Abkhaz decisionmakers credible alternatives when
negotiating with Russia on the management and governance of critical sovereign
issues.30
First, it is essential that Abkhaz be issued visas to travel within the EU and
the United States, and participate in study tours and organized visits. Travel on
Abkhaz passports, which beginning in June 2010 are being issued by Sukhumi to
Abkhaz residents, remains an especially sensitive topic as it directly involves an
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actual symbol and practical aspect of sovereignty. To this end, the Georgian
government has proposed that the Abkhaz accept a travel document, known as a
gray passport, which would be issued by the Georgian government but would not
commit the holder to affirm his or her Georgian citizenship. Though Georgian
concerns about the Abkhaz issuing travel documents are perfectly
understandable and Tbilisi’s position remains consistent with international
law, in this case on balance we believe that the international community should
not rule out allowing some limited Abkhaz to travel on their new self-styled
passports, at least for an initial period for an engagement without recognition
strategy. There is some recent precedent for such a policy. The United Kingdom
and the United States allow residents of the Turkish Northern Republic of
Cyprus (TRNC) to apply for visas and travel on their TRNC passports, even
though the TRNC’s sovereignty remains recognized only by Turkey itself.
The EU is better positioned to take the lead in such efforts because of its
closer proximity to Abkhazia and its active involvement in brokering and now
monitoring the Georgia—Russia ceasefire.
Accordingly, Abkhaz officials, media, and
civil society could be offered study tours of
Brussels to better understand the institutions
and values of the EU. The EU should also
consider opening an information office in
Sukhumi that could liaise with Brussels and
provide information about such engagement
opportunities and application procedures. At
the same time, such tours could include a
visit to NATO headquarters where alliance
representatives could explain the organization’s regional priorities and reassure
the Abkhaz that NATO harbors no belligerent designs on Abkhaz territory.
As far as the United States is concerned, Abkhaz political figures and civil
society representatives should be allowed to participate in regional conferences
and seminars in the Washington think tank community, where contacts with
U.S. officials could be made informally but constructively. It is particularly
important that Abkhaz be allowed to participate in fora in the United States
that address regional concerns and common challenges.
Much more should also be done to diversify Abkhazia’s economic links.
Certainly, Abkhazia’s tourism sector will be a natural target for Russian
investment. But creating economic links with the entire Black Sea region will
give Abkhazia greater economic options and opportunities. Georgia has prevented
these links, however, by putting an embargo on Abkhaz trade with Turkey. This


































the Georgian coast guard intercepted and detained a Turkish fuel tanker bound for
Abkhazia. Georgian courts subsequently tried and convicted the ship’s captain
under the Georgian ‘‘law on occupation,’’ sentencing him to a 24-year prison
sentence and sparking an outcry from the Foreign Ministry of Turkey.31 After some
shuttle diplomacy, Georgian officials agreed to release the captain, but the episode
underscores the practical difficulties that Abkhazia faces in cultivating its
economic relations with Turkey.
Accordingly, establishing procedures by which Turkish vessels can routinely
visit Abkhazia should be a regional economic priority, one that Georgian
officials privately acknowledge needs to be ironed out to provide alternative
commercial routes to Abkhazia.32 Opening a regular ferry link between Sukhumi
and Trabzon, Turkey, is an important step toward enhancing the Abkhaz
diaspora’s link with the territory and further increasing commerce. Both Georgia
and Turkey should encourage day-trip tourism to Abkhazia from specific,
regulated points of access for third-party nationals, as is the case in Northern
Cyprus. Perhaps most controversially, the
international community should also consider
appealing to the International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO) to approve an equal
number of weekly flights between Sukhumi
airport and Istanbul, as between Sukhumi and
Moscow. Ultimately, upgrading Abkhazia’s
transportation links with Turkey and the
greater Black Sea region should be a Western
priority.
In addition, international financial
institutions, such as the World Bank and the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development, should be encouraged to identify and
develop projects that will forge links between Abkhazia and other countries in
the Black Sea region, including Georgia. As the Abkhaz economy develops,
there are a number of economic technical and legal areas (e.g., capital market
formation, accounting standards, and regulatory harmonization) where Abkhazia
will require capacity building and where Western actors could help. For example,
Abkhazian officials have expressed interest in upgrading and developing the
North—South rail corridor through Georgia, which would also potentially allow
travel and commerce between Abkhazia and Armenia.
On the civil society side, Abkhaz nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)
should be connected with broader international networks on issues of common
concern. Previously, the international NGO presence in Abkhazia has been
limited to those working on humanitarian issues, as well as a few that were
facilitating conflict resolution between the Abkhazian and Georgian
Now is the time for
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communities. Yet, there are a number of urgent advocacy issues that Abkhaz civil
society could flag for the broader transnational community and, through this
engagement, benefit from international expertise.
On the environmental front, the rapid development of Sochi and the Abkhaz
Black Sea coast, including opening a massive new cement plant in Tkvarcheli in
preparation for the 2014 Olympic Games, provide an opportunity for concerned
Abkhaz environmental organizations to present their campaign to a broader
international audience. Questions about corruption and good governance
stemming from recent Russian investments in the region would make an ideal
entry point for governance-oriented NGOs to consult with local groups and even
consider opening a local chapter. Human rights and democracy NGOs should
consider generating separate reports on the state of political freedoms and
human rights in Abkhazia, as Freedom House did for the first time in 2009.
Finally, Abkhazia’s media and journalists, recently under severe pressure from the
leadership in Sukhumi because of their critical stories about domestic corruption
and governance problems, would greatly benefit from the opportunity to
participate in exchange programs and join international journalist networks.
All of these international linkages with Abkhazian civil society and media
should be encouraged and can be forged without broaching the question of
Abkhazia’s political status.
Initially, the sequencing of these projects should not be tied to progress or
benchmarks in the Geneva talks between Abkhazia, Georgia, Russia, South
Ossetia, and the United States regarding security in the region, or any other status
negotiations. Rather, the aim of EU and North American policymakers should be
to encourage establishing a wide variety of contacts through which the Abkhaz
can better understand Western priorities and political values while offering a real
alternative to dependence on Russia. Over the medium term, however, the nature
and degree of these contacts could be adjusted or even explicitly tied to an actual
status process or certain reconciliation initiatives with Georgia. Once an array of
international links has been created, the West will have considerably more
leverage over Abkhaz actors in future status negotiations than they do now.
Avoiding Competitive Clientelism in the Caucasus
A policy of engagement without recognition, while probably the only way to
preserve hope for a reunified Georgia, will likely be met with sharp disapproval
from Tbilisi. Since the war, Tbilisi has maintained a hard-line position on
Abkhazia and South Ossetia, stressing that they are occupied parts of Georgia,
and has sought to isolate Abkhazia and South Ossetia from the rest of the world.
Currently, the Georgian government has begun to circulate a new strategy of
promoting cooperation with Abkhazia, but as yet, it remains to be seen how the




























strategy will be implemented and how far it
will go in allowing Abkhazia contacts with
the international community, which are not
mediated by Tbilisi. But the long-term
interests of Georgia and the region need
to be untangled from the short-term
political interests of the current Georgian
government.
It is not yet clear how Russia would
respond to greater Western engagement in
Abkhazia. It is likely that the Russian
reaction would lean in one of two directions. First, Moscow might pressure
Sukhumi not to respond to Western overtures calling for more engagement
fearingnot inaccuratelythat this engagement would lead to reduced Russian
influence in the region. If Russia took this approach, it would lead to greater
tension in the Russian—Abkhaz relationship as Russia would be stopping
Abkhazia from pursuing a policy that would look very appealing to the
Abkhaz. This outcome would be helpful for the West because it would
contribute to the goal of breaking down Russian dominance in Abkhazia.
It is also possible that Russia will determine that it is not worth it to try
to prevent Abkhazia from establishing ties with the West because they want to
avoid conflict with Abkhazia over the issue. Having gone to great lengths to
campaign for Abkhazia’s independence in the international sphere, Moscow may
not want to be viewed as vetoing Abkhazia’s diversification of international ties.
If this happens, engagement without recognition will not meet any obstacles
from Moscow. Either reaction from Russia would make the strategy worth
pursuing from the perspective of the United States.
In recent years, the international politics in the South Caucasus has
descended into competitive clientelism, with the United States strongly
backing Georgia, and Moscow guaranteeing the security of Abkhazia and
South Ossetia. Isolating Abkhazia and the other unrecognized and partially
recognized states no longer serves the interests of the West. Isolating Abkhazia,
as with Eurasia’s other unrecognized states, has only served to strengthen the
hand of the political patrons of these territories and further fragmented the
Eurasian political space. It has also accelerated the region’s remilitarization and
escalated regional tensions to the point of conflict. In the Georgian cases
specifically, isolation has threatened to turn the South Caucasus into a proxy
conflict between Russia and the West. Moreover, open speculation over whether
post—Soviet countries, such as Belarus and Ukraine, will recognize Abkhazia and
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claims and counterclaims across Eurasia that may spiral out of international
control.33
If we are to address the problems of clientelism, isolation, and dependency
which surround the governance of territories such as Abkhazia, Nagorno Karabakh,
and Transdiestria, while preventing their sovereign recognitions from being used as
instruments of geopolitical statecraft by regional powers, we must find new and
creative ways to integrate these territories with the actors, institutions, and
norms of the international community. All of these goals should be sought
without formally recognizing the independence of these territories. These
regions need greater international and regional integration, not continued
isolation. The strategy of engagement without recognition certainly is not
guaranteed to succeed, and carries with it some political risks. Yet, those risks are
worth pursuing to help these areas break their extreme dependence on Moscow.
After 20 years of living with frozen conflicts, and witnessing just how quickly
they can unthaw, it is now time to consider a bold, new approach.
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